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F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES ON CONTRACTS
Joan Kee*
Contracts involving the sale or transfer of artworks generally aspire
to rationalism. Parties sign them in order to maximize gain and minimize
risk. In the art world, the contract is closely associated with a zero-sum
mentality that emphasizes the relationship between artists, gallerists, in-
stitutions, and other owners as one marked by compromise, if not out-
right antagonism. In many cases, the very use of contracts implies that no
one will get everything he, she, or it wants. When the artist is famous, the
contract is a matter of take-it-or-leave-it, and negotiation is not possible.
In such a case, the owner is more likely to treat the prospective purchase
as a unique good for which no acceptable substitution exists.1
The certificates of authenticity and ownership drafted by Fe´lix Gon-
za´lez-Torres offer a different approach to the contract, defined as “a for-
mally documented arrangement for governing a voluntary exchange
relationship in the shadow of the law.”2
Some were issued to owners at the time a work was sold or gifted;
others were issued later. All are notable for the options they give owners
and borrowers of his work. For example, owners and borrowers may ex-
tend or contract for the length of the portrait, while the color in which the
words are painted are left to owners’ discretion.3  Likewise, owners can
decide whether or not to replenish the candies or paper stacks that com-
prise works such as Gonza´lez-Torres’s 1990 piece “Untitled” (A Corner
of Baci).4 Other certificates are less permissive, such as those accompa-
nying Gonza´lez-Torres’s light strings comprised of lightbulbs. These cer-
* Associate Professor, History of Art, University of Michigan. B.A., Yale College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; Ph.D., New York University. The author wishes to thank the participants
and organizers of both editions of “Poetic Justice: On the Intersection of Art and Law in the
Work of Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres,” held at the de la Cruz Collection and Cornell Law School.
1 Adrian Piper and Hans Haacke successfully used a version of The Artist’s Reserved
Rights Transfer and Sale Agreement co-authored by exhibition organizer and curator Seth
Siegelaub and attorney Robert Projansky in 1971; less successful was Bryan Cooke, a Los
Angeles artist who sold a work to the Long Beach Art Museum in 1972 using a form modeled
after the Agreement. The Museum tried to renege on the sale, but Cooke later prevailed.
2 Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 94
(2003).
3 “Untitled” (Portrait of the Cincinnati Art Museum), 1994, (ARG# GF 1994-9) quoted
in Miwon Kwon, The Becoming of a Work of Art: FGT and a Possibility of Renewal, a Chance
to Share, a Fragile Truce, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES 304 (Julie Ault ed., 2006).
4 Andrea Rosen, the executor of Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres’s estate, recalled that the artist
claimed that “if someone chooses to never install a work again, or manifest a manifestable
work again, it may not physically exist, but it does exist because it did exist.” Andrea Rosen &
517
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tificates require owners to replace the bulbs that have burned out, and
some specify a quantity of light bulbs, as well.5  Yet, even these certifi-
cates allow owners considerable freedom over configuration, to the point
where institutions have actually asked the Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres Foun-
dation to set rules as to certificate interpretation.6 By granting certificate
holders these options, Gonza´lez-Torres seems to have reallocated, or
even sacrificed, some of his authorial rights. This action diverges from
the strict rationalism underwriting most written agreements involving the
sale of artworks.
His early certificates, issued before 1992, tended to resemble a hy-
brid of a conventional certificate of authenticity and a set of instructions.
At this time, most certificates of authenticity contained only a brief
description of the work including its title, year of creation, dimensions,
and constituent materials.7 By far the most important aspect was the art-
ist’s signature, which provided proof that the work had been made by the
signatory. These certificates resembled, or sometimes were in fact, con-
tracts. Gonza´lez-Torres’s earliest certificates also included a signature
and a description of the work, with the latter comprised of “instructions
for installation.” Over time, the certificates became increasingly longer
and frequently described in detail the actions an owner must undertake to
effectively complete the work. Beginning approximately in late 1994, the
certificates were identified as contracts signed by both the owner and the
artist (and his estate). Some were issued to owners at the time a work
was sold or gifted; others were issued later. Referred to as “agreements,”
they were signed not only by the artist and his gallery, but by the owner
as well. Their length and language more closely resembled contracts than
they did conventional certificates of authenticity. More specifically, they
delegated to owners the task of entering into other agreements on the
work’s behalf, namely loan agreements. Certificates drafted after the art-
ist’s death include a provision granting the Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres Foun-
Tino Seghal, Interview, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: SPECIFIC OBJECTS WITHOUT SPECIFIC FORM
409 (Andrea Rosen & Elena Filipovic eds., 2016).
5 See Carol Bove’s description of her experience installing “Untitled” (For Stockholm)
(1992). Carol Bove, Some Notes on Venue 2, Installation 2, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: SPE-
CIFIC OBJECTS WITHOUT SPECIFIC FORM 203 (Andrea Rosen & Elena Filipovic eds., 2016); see
also Interviews by Tim Rollins with Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres, in New York, N.Y. at 8 (Apr. 16,
1993 & June 12, 1993).
6 Rosen states that a primary job of the Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres Foundation has been to
record the various manifestations of each work. She is adamant, however, that “the case stud-
ies are not a recording of what the rules are, even though institutions would like us to do this.”
Andrea Rosen & Tino Seghal, Interview, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: SPECIFIC OBJECTS WITH-
OUT SPECIFIC FORM 395 (Andrea Rosen & Elena Filipovic eds., 2016).
7 On the evolution of the certificates’ length and complexity see David Deitcher, Con-
tradictions and Containment, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES 321 (Julie Ault ed., 2006).
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dation and the Andrea Rosen Gallery “the authority to bond” the buyer to
the agreement’s terms.8
These longer certificates recalled an alternative, and more specific,
definition of contracts famously proposed by legal scholar Stewart Ma-
caulay, one that highlighted contracts as “devices for conducting ex-
changes.”9 The length and language of these longer certificates more
closely resembled contracts than they did conventional certificates of au-
thenticity. While the language is not technical legal jargon, the diction,
syntax, and vocabulary contained in the certificates are studiedly neutral
and distinctly non-colloquial. The certificates demanded from readers a
kind of attention analogous to that commanded by a contract. In particu-
lar, the resemblance compels readers to pay close attention to individual
words rather than search for a coherent narrative.
I argue that Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates provide a model for re-
considering how contracts involving the sale or exchange of artworks
might work more effectively. His certificates’ language and structure
both mirrored and diverged from the wording and organization of most
sales contracts, which enhanced their authority by framing owner com-
pliance as optional. Gonza´lez-Torres intended owners to execute his
works in particular ways. Yet the certificates often expressed the artist’s
intentions as choices owners could make rather than as conditions that
had to be fulfilled, or even obligations they were bound to perform. Ini-
tially written without the advice of legal counsel, the certificates lack
either the clarity or precision expected of contracts generally.10 Yet these
presumptive shortcomings enable the certificates to compel a remarkable
level of owner compliance with the artist’s intentions without the acri-
mony that often accompanied such transactions.
I. UNCERTAINTY IN DOCUMENTATION
What is a certificate of authenticity? To sellers, it was a glorified
bill of sale, a superfluous extra often grudgingly provided to owners to
reassure them of the pedigree of their new acquisition. Influential New
York gallerist, Andre Emmerich, derided the very idea of the certifi-
cate.11 He stated that a seller’s reputation was sufficient proof of a
8 Whether new certificates of authenticity issued for resold Gonza´lez-Torres works will
also obligate owners to the David Zwirner Gallery (which since February 2017 co-represents
the Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres estate) remains to be seen.
9 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963).
10 Recently, certificates have been amended with the advice of outside legal counsel.
11 Dep. of Andre Emmerich, Greenberg Gallery, Inc. v. Bauman, 817 F. Supp. 167
(D.D.C. 1993) archived in Archives of Am. Art, Smithsonian Inst., Series II, Box 2., 43 (hous-
ing records from the Barbara Mathes Gallery pertaining to the Rio Nero lawsuit, 1989-1995,
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work’s authenticity: “My good name rides with everything I sell.”12 Yet,
a certificate could also be a potential source of liability, particularly for
owners for whom a certificate of authenticity might appear to have more
legal authority than it actually does. They read the certificate as a war-
ranty, there to preserve the economic value of their purchase. To judges,
a certificate might be a quasi-affidavit furnished by the seller or merely
another piece of evidence concerning the seller’s intentions.
To many artists, a certificate of authenticity was yet another re-
minder of how their works circulated in a market not of their own mak-
ing or control. As Sol LeWitt remarked in 1974, not long after the
dramatic expansion of the contemporary art market in the U.S., the art-
work “always ends up in the hands of people who you feel don’t think
the way you do, or they use art as speculation or as a commodity. It
becomes very depressing . . . .”13 For some artists the certificate was part
of the cost of doing business; for others, it was an opportunity to deter-
mine some of the terms of their works’ circulation.
This happened even with conceptual artworks as well as works that
could be easily replicated using everyday objects. For such works, the
certificate of authenticity was sometimes the only tangible proof estab-
lishing their identity or existence.
Gonza´lez-Torres, who saw an affinity between his works and those
of his conceptualist predecessors like LeWitt, regarded his certificates in
a similar light. He saw himself operating “as part of the market,” regard-
ing it as more effective to work within, rather than outside, its struc-
tures.14 Macaulay’s more specific definition of contracts helps clarify
how Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates operate in this manner. Congruent
with Macaulay’s definition, many of Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates pro-
vide for future anticipated contingencies such as allowing different beads
to be used if one brand is unavailable.15 Likewise, Gonza´lez-Torres often
specified the type of candy to be used in a particular work; however, if
that brand was not available at the time an owner wished to execute that
work a comparable version may be used as long as it meets certain pa-
rameters. An owner of “Untitled” (A Corner of Baci), for example,
“may” use candies other than regular size Perugina Baci chocolates if
referring to the Greenberg Gallery case, which turned on determining whether the Rio Nero
was an authentic work by Alexander Calder).
12 Id.
13 Interview by Paul Cummings with Sol LeWitt (Jul. 15, 1974), https://www.aaa.si.edu/
collections/interviews/oral-history-interview-sol-lewitt-12701.
14 Rollins, supra note 5. R
15 Id. at 3.
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“these candies are not available.”16 Unlike Macaulay’s definition, Gon-
za´lez-Torres’s certificates do not specify or suggest how legal sanctions
could be taken to force bearers to fulfill the certificates’ terms or to com-
pensate the artist (or his estate) for non-fulfillment of the same.
While the lack of enforceability may bar Gonza´lez-Torres’s certifi-
cates from being properly known as contracts, it nevertheless sheds light
on why they constitute a productive alternative to the strongly adversarial
mindset underlying many agreements about the ownership of artworks.
They contrast directly from the often antagonistic relationship between
buyers and sellers, one aggravated by judicial concern over a perceived
imbalance of knowledge between the shrewd seller and the relatively na-
ı¨ve buyer. Courts were concerned with correcting what they saw as an
imbalance of power between buyers and sellers of artwork. By the late
1980s, some courts even attempted to apply the concept of strict liability
to sellers.17
At the same time, it was painfully clear to many artists that the law
would do little to protect artists as an occupational class. Despite Con-
gress passing the Visual Arts Rights Act (VARA)18 in 1990, which
granted some artists (namely painters and sculptors) certain protections
concerning attribution and destruction of their works, courts and legisla-
tures were reluctant, and often unwilling, to make concessions for the
specific nature of artworks.19 The law refused in particular to protect the
economic rights of artists unless previously negotiated through con-
tracts.20 Moreover, cuts in public arts funding and incessant calls for the
abolition of government arts administration bodies during the 1980s and
early 1990s required artists to be entrepreneurial in what laws they could
invoke on behalf of their own interests.21 Such privatization of culture in
turn compelled several artists to turn to contracts in an effort to secure
what rights they could.
Yet contracts were hardly a cure-all, as the tempestuous relationship
between Donald Judd and Italian collector Giuseppe Panza so amply
demonstrated. After buying the plans for fourteen untitled and unrealized
works between 1974 and 1975, Panza had several works made according
16 ARG #GF 1990-20, quoted in Miwon Kwon, The Becoming of a Work of Art: FGT
and a Possibility of Renewal, a Chance to Share, a Fragile Truce, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES
299 (Julie Ault, ed., 2006).
17 Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 562 (1988).
18 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990).
19 For a discussion of the restrictive scope of VARA, see David E. Shipley, The Empty
Promise of VARA: The Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 MISS. L.J. 985 (2014).
20 Id. at 996.
21 For a useful discussion of artistic entrepreneurship in the wake of arts funding cuts,
see LANE RELYEA, YOUR EVERYDAY ART WORLD (2013).
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to what he thought were Judd’s instructions.22 The artist angrily dis-
owned the works, claiming that the fabrications did not satisfactorily
meet his standards.23 In a statement published in the April 1990 issue of
Art in America, Judd all but accused Panza of negligence that he implied
was in direct violation of his intentions: “[Panza] thinks my work has no
existence beyond the paper in his files and that it can come and go as he
pleases and as he designs it; now it can be multiplied as he pleases.”24 In
this case, Judd seemed to regard the certificate from the perspective of a
transactional lawyer, that is, as a written instrument formalizing an
agreement that he believed to have made with Panza. The contract could
have added that Judd or his representative had to first approve the recrea-
tion before acknowledging the work as his own.
There is no evidence to suggest that Gonza´lez-Torres knew of the
Judd-Panza conflict, but tensions between artists, sellers, and buyers had
become especially fraught after the dramatic expansion of the contempo-
rary art market during the 1970s and 80s. During this time, the certifi-
cates issued by a small, but influential group of artists, many of whom
were affiliated with Minimalism and Post-Minimalism, became de facto
contracts. Some examples include those signed by Robert Barry and
James Turrell for works sold to Italian collector Giuseppe Panza. Barry’s
was a single page, single-spaced document that included all the classic
requirements of a binding contract: an offer, mention of consideration,
and an acceptance by both parties of the certificate’s terms. Drafted by
Panza’s attorney Jerald Ordover, Turrell’s was a multi-page contract that
looked very much like a boilerplate agreement. But that most contracts
generally revolve around how and when its terms can be enforced made
sellers reluctant to enter into contracts generally. It may explain the ab-
sence from Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates of imperative terms like
“must” and “cannot,” an omission that is particularly striking given their
frequency in other certificates. The certificate for Robert Barry’s untitled
series of open plywood cubes (1972–1973), for example, contains “shall
not” and “shall,” words commonly used when one party seeks to impose
an obligation on someone else.
At the same time, buyers demanded from sellers various proofs or
guarantees that their purchases were legitimate. Andrea Rosen, Gonza´-
lez-Torres’s gallerist and the executor of his estate, stated that the certifi-
cates were issued to reassure owners who found it difficult to see how an
22 MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART 37 (2003). For
a thoughtful discussion of the Panza-Judd conflict, see id. at 34-42.
23 Id. at 38.
24 Donald Judd, Letter to the Editor, Artist Disowns ‘Copied’ Sculpture, 78 ART AM. 33
(April 1990).
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idea could be a unique work of art.25 Indeed, the certificate of authentic-
ity had a special prominence as it was often the only documentation other
than the bill of sale or an invoice to document the value of an artwork.
For conceptual artworks, or works that could be easily replicated using
everyday objects, the certificate of authenticity had even greater import
as the only tangible proof establishing the identity or existence of a spe-
cific work.26 Moreover, the certificate of authenticity and/or ownership
was one of the few types of written documentation actively desired in a
market notorious for its aversion to contracts. In a 1990 essay in Arts
Magazine, lawyer Tim Cone described the transactional environment of
the art world as one that could only work based on “shared visions, trust,
and goodwill [rather] than on economic needs.”27 Without some sense of
common purpose, not even “the threat of a lawsuit” will “keep either side
from breaking its promises.”28
II. THE REASONABLE CONTRACT
Performance studies scholar Joshua Chambers-Letson has argued
that Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates effectively take on the role of a
purchase contract because they suggest the existence of an agreement
between the artist (and later, representatives of his estate) and the owner,
who both sign the document.29 He claims that Gonza´lez-Torres’s certifi-
cates embody a transformation of the contract from a hidebound instru-
ment of control into “a potential agent of change.”30 Chambers-Letson is
on the right track, but the potential for transformation seems to lie more
squarely in how each certificate diminishes the sense of encumbrance
that might ordinarily attach to the conditions each certificate specifies are
necessary to the proper completion of a work.31 Where contracts specify
that parties fulfill certain requirements as a necessary step in securing a
particular benefit, most certificates of Gonza´lez-Torres do not actually
require bearers to fulfill particular terms.
25 See Anne Cushwa, Untitled (A Dissertation for Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres) 38 (May 2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (on file with Proquest).
26 See id. at 37.
27 Timothy Cone, A Case for Contracts, 65 ARTS MAG. 27, 27 (Nov. 1990).
28 Id.
29 Joshua Takano Chambers-Letson, Contracting Justice: The Viral Strategy of Fe´lix
Gonza´lez-Torres, 51 CRITICISM 559, 575 (2009).
30 Id.
31 Contrast the language of Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates with the Agreement Commis-
sioning Works of Art between Panza and the artist Michael Asher. The Agreement Commis-
sioning Works stipulate that the artist will authenticate the work as his only if Panza’s
realization “complies in all respects with the artist’s design.” Agreement Commissioning
Works of Art between Panza and the artist Michael Asher, Giuseppe Panza Papers Collection,
Series IV, Box 174 (on file with Getty Research Institute, Special Collections).
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The majority of Gonza´lez-Torres certificates contain no outright ob-
ligations, only conditions whose fulfillment is in fact entirely optional
since the work is the idea and not its physical manifestation.32 Relying
heavily on conditional words like “may,” the certificate functions more
like an offer than evidence of an already negotiated agreement.  “Fortune
cookies of other producers may be used provided that the messages they
contain are optimistic,” reads the certificate for “Untitled” (Fortune
Cookie Corner), 1990.33
Art critic David Deitcher speculates that the phrasing incorporates a
standard of reasonableness: it is to account for “the realities of life as it is
lived” or for what owners could “realistically be expected to make” by
way of financial commitment and time spent on the work.34 Gonza´lez-
Torres’s certificates seem worded to minimize the anxiety experienced
by even the most sophisticated owners of earlier instruction-based works.
Consider the mad scramble of Paul Maenz, the German dealer who was
among the most proactive in commodifying conceptual art, to locate the
exact fluorescent tubes he thought were mandatory to execute a legiti-
mate Dan Flavin work: “I can’t use the Flavin unless I have the correct
tubes. And unless the whole thing works I can’t sell it.”35 In contrast,
Gonza´lez-Torres often amended or even changed his certificates to ac-
commodate owner concerns.36 The tone and content of his certificates
anticipate what in recent years has been a more overtly relational ap-
proach to contract formation based on emphasizing the contract as a
commemoration of alliance between contracting parties.
But as Tim Rollins observed, Gonza´lez-Torres’s works were not
“completely arbitrary or intuitive.”37 The detailed instructions, length,
and specificity of conditions given strongly imply that the artist wished
at least some compliance from owners. By giving options, especially for
matters from which one might expect some direction or instruction, the
certificates emphasize that the act of fulfilling a Gonza´lez-Torres certifi-
cate is voluntary. This may in fact be why Gonza´lez-Torres’ certificates
32 A striking exception is “Untitled” (1991), consisting of a wooden box whose contents
the owner has agreed never to display in public. Whether this condition was written into the
certificate accompanying the work is unknown, but nevertheless conspicuous in the context of
the artist’s other certificates. Cited in Elena Filipovic, Specific Objects Without Specific Form,
F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: SPECIFIC OBJECTS WITHOUT SPECIFIC FORM 17 (Andrea Rosen &
Elena Filipovic, eds., 2016).
33 Deitcher, supra note 7, at 323. R
34 See David Deitcher, Contradictions and Containment, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: CAT-
ALOGUE RAISONN ´E 107 (Ostfildern-Ruit: Cantz, 1997).
35 Letter from Paul Maenz to Joseph Kosuth (Mar. 2, 1977) (on file with the Getty Re-
search Institute).
36 Anne Jennifer Cushwa, Untitled (A Dissertation for Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres) 48 (May
2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (on file with the School of Art &
Art History, University of Iowa).
37 Rollins, supra note 5. R
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have been so scrupulously honored: not because the owner was afraid of
what might happen if the terms were left unfulfilled, but because com-
pleting the work was so explicitly a function of choice.
Yet making choices was not without risk or consequence. Consider
“Untitled” (for Parkett), an editioned work that Gonza´lez-Torres con-
ceived for the journal Parkett and offered for sale in 1994.38 Owners
received sheets of paper and a certificate indicating that they could
“complete” the work by attaching the sheets to a wall to form a giant
billboard. Removing the sheets, however, meant the work’s permanent
and irrevocable destruction. Such a claim reduces the chances that an
owner might regard a deinstalled work as a mutilated, but still salvage-
able commodity. Owners may thus choose to complete the work, know-
ing that to do so would likely mean the permanent destruction of his or
her investment, unless the building containing the walls to which the
work was attached was also being sold and the certificate accompanying
the work also changed hands. If the owner chooses not to attach the
sheets, she may recoup (and see a profit) on her initial investment, but
the work remains incomplete. Only the right to make and display a com-
pleted Gonza´lez-Torres would be sold. The effect differed from a compa-
rable work, Kay Rosen’s 1995 wall painting Leak, which consisted of
two words (“Floor” and “Roof”) painted directly on a wall.39 Rosen
specified that if the work’s location or ownership change, the present
work should be painted over and a new work recreated “to the best of the
owner’s ability.”40
Furthermore, it was unclear just how closely owners were expected
to abide by the terms of Gonza´lez-Torres’ certificates. Despite being
characterized as “utilitarian,” the language of the certificates often fails
to adhere to the kind of precision required for legally binding contracts to
work efficiently.41 The language vacillates between precision and vague-
ness. One certificate for an early billboard piece grants the owners the
“exclusive right to reproduce the billboard[s] in public as often as they
like, at what ever [sic] scale they like, at however many locations they
choose.”42 The wording of the certificate avoids a common mistake in
38 Parkett Art, Artists’ Documents and Archive, http://www.parkettart.com/archive/39-
archive-Gonza´lez.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
39 Kay Rosen, This is to Certify (unpublished manuscript) (accompanying Kay Rosen,
Leak (1998)).
40 Id.
41 See David Deitcher, Contradictions and Containment, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES: CAT-
ALOGUE RAISONN ´E 107 (Ostfildern-Ruit: Cantz, 1997).
42 Andrea Rosen, “Untitled” (The Neverending Portrait), in [I: Text] F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-
TORRES, 44, 48 (Dietmar Elger, ed., 1997) (quoting “Certificates of Authenticity / Ownership
that accompany [Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres billboards]”).
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contract drafting whereby “exclusive” and “sole” are used interchangea-
bly; the former gives only one owner the right.
After Gonza´lez-Torres’s death, the word “utmost” started to appear
in certificates issued by the Andrea Rosen Gallery with regard to the
owner’s right to lend Gonza´lez-Torres’s work. Specifically, owners must
exercise “utmost discretion” in choosing when and if to lend the work.
The provision was added to replace an earlier term introduced in 1994 in
which owners had to secure the express written permission of the artist if
they wanted to lend his works elsewhere. Given this history, “utmost”
may suggest that owners have a duty to act primarily in the artist’s inter-
ests even if it infringes on an owner’s presumptive right to freely use his
or her property. When Gonza´lez-Torres’s portrait “Untitled” was sold
jointly to the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and the Art Institute
of Chicago in 2002, the certificate issued by the Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres
Foundation strikingly characterized the owner as “the caretaker he [Gon-
za´lez-Torres] entrusted with this work’s evolution.”43 But who in fact
determines whether an owner has properly discharged his, her, or its
caretaking duties? As seen by the wide exhibition of Gonza´lez-Torres
works, “utmost discretion” in practice simply refers to “reasonable”
discretion.
Several sentences, on the other hand, are so pointedly imprecise as
to seem almost intentional. A common statement in many certificates,
“this certificate is necessary to define ownership,” reads almost as a non-
sequitur; here “establish” should replace “define.” If protection of Gon-
za´lez-Torres’s intention was in fact the certificates’ primary aim, several
points could have been more strongly or specifically worded. For exam-
ple, instead of “if this exact candy is not available, a similar candy may
be used,” it could be “a candy of similar color, size, and weight can be
used if the candy identified above is not available.” A standard phrase—
“the physical manifestation of this work in more than one place at a time
does not impugn this work’s uniqueness”—is unclear due to the im-
proper use of “impugn.” A verb meaning “to doubt” or “attack,” the
word is most often used in legal contexts to assess witness credibility or
in cases involving defamation.  “Undermine” or “negate” would be more
appropriate. Moreover, “impugn” sounds strangely out of place in rela-
tion to the certificates’ plain language. It seems almost as if the artist or
his representatives were attempting to have the certificate sound more
authoritative, or to at least imbue it with the air of a legally binding
contract.
The looseness of the language comes across as intentional and even
strategic. For example, the certificate for “Untitled” (Fortune Cookie
43 Kwon, supra note 3, at 308 (quoting the certificate for “Untitled,” 1989 (ARG-#GF R
1989-20), 4).
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Corner) indicates that other messages can be used provided they are “op-
timistic.”44 The use of “optimistic,” a word indicating affect, seems to
compromise the specificity of its message. The semantic porosity of
Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates underscores how open the documents
were to subsequent interpretation. Rosen observes how Gonza´lez-Torres
determined the size of his works based on “standards.”45 There may have
been no one “right size” of paper, for example, but certain factors, such
as the proportions of the display venue did affect how Gonza´lez-Torres
himself determined the formal appearance of the work.46 The adherence
to “standards” is reflected in the prominence and consistency with which
the word “ideal” appears throughout Gonza´lez-Torres’s certificates. The
Foundation has stated that the ideal height of a paper stack work is a
dimension “that is negotiated each time the work is exhibited.”47
But “ideal” also resonates with the reasonableness standard often
used to determine the lawfulness of a person’s behavior. A particular
height or configuration need not be followed to the letter, but there is an
intimation that certificate bearers should be reasonable in deciding how
high paper stacks should be or where candies are placed.  An ideal height
for the paper stacks is prescribed (the actual height of the original instal-
lation), but the owner, in theory, is free to choose any height, a freedom
that could hypothetically lead him or her to erect a stack so tall as to
make it impossible for some viewers to take individual sheets. In this
case, would the paper stack still be considered a Gonza´lez-Torres per the
certificate declaration that “a part of the intention of the work is that third
parties may take individual sheets of paper from the stack”?48
In using the term “ideal” rather than more standard terms like “re-
quired” or “mandatory,” Gonza´lez-Torres addressed what might be the
most crucial aspect of any contract: the likelihood of its enforcement. He
appeared to move away from the restorative models inherent in contracts,
whereby the non-fulfillment of one term would result in the compensa-
tion of the injured party or punishment of the errant party. Indeed, the
point of the certificates may have been to set up a framework different
from the one espoused by the law. It is a bit different from how film and
video works are sold; a phenomenon that emerged in the 1990s, it specif-
ically involved collectors signing purchase agreements that detailed very
44 Deitcher, supra note 7, at 323. R
45 Andrea Rosen, “Untitled” (The Neverending Portrait), in [I: Text] F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-
TORRES, 44, 48, 49 (Dietmar Elger, ed., 1997) (quoting “Certificates of Authenticity / Owner-
ship that accompany [Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres billboards]”).
46 Id.
47 Email from Emilie Keldie to Joan Kee, the author (28 September 2015) (on file with
author).
48 A comparable certificate is that issued for “Untitled” (Memorial Day Weekend), 1989.
See Deitcher, supra note 7, at 322. R
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clearly how the works would be shown.49 But where the obligations as-
sociated with the purchase of film and video works were largely to en-
sure the quality of the image, thereby casting film and video as
themselves fixed objects, many Gonza´lez-Torres works are meant to be
given away with their initial presentation taking any number of forms.50
From a liability perspective, the looseness of the certificates’ word-
ing accommodated the concern some institutional owners were likely to
have about their own responsibilities. Museums, for example, represent a
type of owner characterized by keen aversion to all forms of legal liabil-
ity as well as correspondingly high levels of vigilance in safeguarding
the tangible property it owns.51 Uncertain language helps ensure that de-
viations from the certificates’ terms are less likely to trigger anxiety over
whether such changes would be seen as actionable violations. In order to
put the relationship before the transaction, then, the language of the cer-
tificates had to contain enough uncertainty so that deviations would not
necessarily be regarded as violations of the agreement.
III. TOWARDS POST-OWNERSHIP?
Probing further, the freedoms of choice contained in a Gonza´lez-
Torres certificate evoke what might be called the frictional nature of
owners’ ethical lives. This was especially well articulated in his certifi-
cate for “Untitled” (For Parkett), a work conceived for the journal
Parkett in 1994.52 Offered for sale by the magazine in an edition of
eighty-four, it consisted of eight silkscreened sheets of paper and a certif-
icate indicating that “the work is not complete until installed.”53 As seen
by the work’s installation in various iterations of the traveling exhibition
49 Erika Balsom, Original Copies: How Film and Video Became Art Objects, 53 CINEMA
J. 99, 110 (2013)(noting that the sale of a limited-edition film or video includes both a certifi-
cate of authenticity and a contract specifying the owner’s rights to exhibition and display).
50 As Robert Storr writes, buying a work “legally committed the purchaser to passing
along the very thing he or she had just acquired.” While the certificates were not contracts by
legal definition, Storr points out that the intention was for owners to cultivate a mindset of
surrender rather than possession. See When This You See Remember Me, F ´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-
TORRES 16 (Julie Ault ed. 2006).
51 One is reminded of how the Hirshhorn Museum made sure that the lightbulbs used in
their Gonza´lez-Torres retrospective had to be remade to adhere to national safety codes. Mem-
orandum from Kathy Watt to Amada Cruz (Jan. 11, 1993) (on file with the Smithsonian Insti-
tution Archives). Similar was Cruz’s decision to make “Placebo 2” smaller in her proposal for
the U.S. Pavilion at the 1995 Venice Biennale so that visitors could more easily access emer-
gency exits per safety regulations. Letter from Amada Cruz to Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres (Feb. 22,
1994) (on file with the Smithsonian Institution Archives).
52 MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/61173?lo-
cale=EN (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
53 See LIVE AUCTIONEERS, https://new.liveauctioneers.com/item/10605828_Fe´lix-Gonza´
lez-torresuntitled-for-parkett https://new.liveauctioneers.com/item/10605828_Fe´lix-Gonza´lez-
torresuntitled-for-parkett; PHILLIPS AUCTION HOUSE, https://www.phillips.com/detail/F ´ELIX-
GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES/NY030210/292 (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\26-3\CJP307.txt unknown Seq: 13 18-MAY-17 15:10
2017] F´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES ON CONTRACTS 529
“200 Artworks – 25 Years, Artists’ Editions for Parkett,” completion was
interpreted to mean attaching the sheets to a wall to form a giant bill-
board.54 It would follow then, that removing the sheets resulted in the
work’s permanent and irrevocable destruction since the sheets were irre-
placeable. Hypothetically, owners installing the work do so knowing that
it will likely mean the permanent destruction of his or her investment.55
It is of course possible to imagine that the completed work could con-
tinue to “live” if the building containing the walls to which the work was
attached was also being sold and the certificate for the work transferred
to a new owner. If the owner chooses not to attach the sheets, she may
recoup (and see a profit) on her initial investment, but the work remains
incomplete. Only the right to make and display a completed Gonza´lez-
Torres would be sold.
The certificate for the Parkett edition is unique among Gonza´lez-
Torres’s certificates in how it so explicitly pits two different values
against one another. One concerns the protection of the work’s economic
value as defined by an owner physically possessing the certificate af-
firming its existence and authorizing its creation. The other concerns the
most valuable use of resources, in this case, the sheets comprising the
billboard. At stake is how owners externalize what they see as owner-
ship; here they must choose between redeeming the financial investment
they made in buying the work and the unquantifiable pleasure or satisfac-
tion that comes with being able to complete it. For very wealthy collec-
tors for whom the market value of the work is relatively modest (recent
auction records suggest that it would be in the neighborhood of $10,000),
the question is less pressing. The situation may be different for other
owners, especially those who first bought the edition when it was priced
at less than a thousand dollars and for whom the Parkett editions re-
present an accessible way of collecting works by well-known artists at a
reasonable price.
For a collector, fulfilling the terms of a Gonza´lez-Torres certificate
is a particularly compelling way of signaling one’s identity because it
suggests that he or she is more than a self-interested hoarder, a speculator
or profiteer. The example of “Untitled” (For Parkett) suggests the possi-
bility of a kind of post-ownership, in which the relationship between the
artwork and the potential (or in this case imminent) owner is not prima-
rily determined by the latter’s efforts to claim absolute legal title to the
former. In such a context, ownership is most fully expressed when the
54 For some examples see Parkett Art, http://www.parkettart.com/archive/39-archive-
Gonza´lez.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2017). See also F´ELIX GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES 195 (Julie Ault
ed., 2006).
55 One of the few documented examples is the installation of the work at the former
Long’s Bookstore near Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio. Initially owned by Byrne,
the work was gifted to his Skylark Foundation, and then to the University.
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property is freely shared with others. Admittedly, such recognition is
more likely when the artwork is relatively less valuable in economic
terms and when there is a strong possibility of reaping other forms of
gain, such as public acclaim for one’s philanthropic benevolence.
The certificate poses a singular test for an owner living in a transac-
tional culture that holds economic self-interest as paramount. It parses
the idea of “should” into further questions regarding the correctness and
appropriateness of a decision. It is not incorrect to pursue either path;
that is, it is contractually acceptable to either complete or not complete
the work. Many choose not to “complete” the work as seen by the works
offered and sold occasionally at auction.56 And what happens when, as in
the case of the work’s installation at Ohio State University in 2015, the
work is installed but there is no accompanying certificate? In that partic-
ular instance, the sheets were purchased at auction but no certificate ac-
companied the sale.57
But if one admits that ownership also means acknowledging mem-
bership in a particular community of interests, it has us ask if the imme-
diately rational choice (preservation of exchange value) is really the
optimal choice. Belonging to a particular community of interests (or
what Gonza´lez-Torres would have called a “community of concern”),
means recognizing the role public access plays in his work. “I need the
public to complete the work” was a favorite quote of his, usually made in
reference to the replenishable candy piles or paper stacks. In this case,
the “public” suggests another incentive for completing the work: the op-
portunity to create the greatest good for the largest number of people.
When installed, “Untitled” (For Parkett) becomes a work many people
could easily see and enjoy. Indeed, when the collector Blake Byrne
gifted his edition of “Untitled” (For Parkett) to Ohio State University,
the building formerly housing the landmark bookstore Long’s was cho-
56 At the January 2012 Phillips auction in New York, the sale price of the work was
estimated to fall between USD 8000 and 12000; at the February 2013 Phillips auction in
London, the work sold for GBP 6250 and at the September 2013 Christies auction in London
for GBP 6000.  In these auctions, the work was offered as a set of prints and not as an installed
billboard. See, for instance, LIVE AUCTIONEERS, https://new.liveauctioneers.com/item/
10605828_Fe´lix-Gonza´lez-torresuntitled-for-parkett (last visited Mar. 14, 2017) and PHILLIPS
AUCTION HOUSE, https://www.phillips.com/detail/F ´ELIX-GONZ ´ALEZ-TORRES/NY030210/
292 (last visited Mar. 14, 2017).
57 Blake Byrne had acquired an edition of “Untitled” (For Parkett) at auction; his foun-
dation (the Skylark Foundation) unsuccessfully attempted to acquire the certificate. Eventually
a copy of the certificate was provided by Parkett. The lack of a certificate seemed to have no
bearing on the care with which the work was installed at Ohio State University; even the
destruction was meticulously recorded. Email from Barbara Schwan to Joan Kee (Sep. 29,
2015) (on file with author).
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sen because it was not only available, but “visible daily to students,
faculty and community.”58
The certificate for the Parkett edition serves a rejoinder to the con-
text of economic self-interest validated as rational thinking. It offers
owners a chance to think outside the limitations of economics as a ba-
rometer of valuable action. As legal scholar Richard Posner has pointed
out, economics cannot tell us whether one choice is more ethically or
socially valuable than another.59 The certificate for the Parkett edition
entrusts that decision to owners like Byrne, therefore suggesting how
ownership was something to be earned via the quality of one’s choices
rather than merely acquired with money and some luck.
Over time, the process of manifesting Gonza´lez-Torres’s works cre-
ates social connections that produce their own sense of moral obligation.
It is a kind of obligation that has owners internalize how Gonza´lez-
Torres himself might have negotiated the challenges posed by working a
particular set of spatial and material variables. The result is the produc-
tion of a type of empathy that permits owners to regard themselves as
collaborators or even as co-authors rather than as purchasers or owners.
In doing this, Gonza´lez-Torres might have been responding to what the
gallerist Paul Maenz described to the artist Joseph Kosuth in 1977 as the
“gap between people who like art and people who do art.”60 By recasting
the fulfillment of terms as a personal, and even emotional matter, Gonza´-
lez-Torres seemed intent on erasing that distance as much as possible.61
Thus, if the certificates of Gonza´lez-Torres resemble contracts, they
do so in order to suggest a different approach to contract, one that looks
to the underlying relationship such documents seek to uphold rather than
enforcing specific, yet imperfect terms used in the course of transaction.
Their main objective is not to identify and punish instances of noncom-
pliance, but rather to improve the chances that an agreement’s general
terms will be upheld. They did so by transforming the act of purchase
into a pledge to commit to a distinctly non-pecuniary relationship. In
sum, the certificates of Fe´lix Gonza´lez-Torres ask to be read in ways that
have us imagine action beyond the official and unofficial laws now gov-
erning the relationships created by the sale of an artwork—relationships
formed in the names of commerce and love both.
58 Barbara Schwan, email to Joan Kee, the author (Sep. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
The building was slated for demolition together with the billboard.
59 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1973).
60 Letter from Paul Maenz to Joseph Kosuth (Feb. 10, 1977) (on file with the Getty
Research Institute).
61 See id.
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